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ARGUMENT 
L PETITIONER ADEQUATELY MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE UNDER 
THE CIRCUMSTANCES. 
The City claims Guenon failed to make any "attempt whatsoever to marshal the 
evidence that supported the City's factual findings." (See Brief of Respondent, pg. 13). 
That is clearly not the case. In his opening brief, Guenon recited nearly six pages of facts 
and testimony elicited at the Appeals Board hearing. (See Brief of Petitioner, pg. 3-9). 
Most of Guenon's contentions on appeal are legal in nature and do not directly 
relate to evidence elicited at the Appeals Board hearing. To the extent Guenon failed to 
marshal evidence, however, it is because the City presented such scant evidence at the 
hearing. Indeed, this Court has found that there is no need to painstakingly marshal every 
scrap of evidence under such circumstances: 
There is, in effect, no need for an appellant to marshal the evidence 
when the findings are so inadequate that they cannot be 
meaningfully challenged as factual determinations. In other words, 
the way to attack findings which appear to be complete and which 
are sufficiently detailed is to marshal the supporting evidence and 
then demonstrate the evidence is inadequate to sustain such findings. 
But where the findings are not of that caliber, appellant need not go 
through a futile marshaling exercise. Rather, appellant can simply 
argue the legal insufficiency of the court's findings as framed. 
Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474, 477-478 (Utah App. 1991). Out of an abundance of 
caution, Guenon will address the City's marshaling argument with respect to each of the 
four issues identified by the City in its opening brief. 
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A. Issue No. 1: Identification Cards. 
Guenon does not contest the City's written policy on the handling of evidence. 
Nor does Guenon dispute the finding that he failed to book identification cards into 
evidence in accordance with that policy. Guenon is not required to marshal evidence on 
issues he does not contest. 
Guenon's sole contention on appeal is that it was the common practice within the 
Department for officers to ignore the evidence policy, often leaving identification cards 
lying around the police station, in their vehicles, and in the wastebasket. Although the 
violating officers' direct superiors knew this was going on, they felt it was a common 
practice and therefore never disciplined the offending officers. R. 75: pg. 228 (5-19); R. 
93: pg. 301 (2-25). Because the City elicited no evidence at the hearing to contradict 
these points, there was nothing for Guenon to marshal on appeal. 
Despite abundant, undisputed evidence that Guenon merely followed the common 
practice of the Department, the Appeals board found "that [Guenon's] violation of the 
General Order regarding evidence and property was substantially more significant than 
what other officers may have done..." {See Finding of Fact No. 8 attached as Addendum 
B to Petitioner's Brief). However, the City presented no evidence that Guenon's conduct 
was more significant than that of other officers. Accordingly, there was no evidence to 
marshal. Woodward, 823 P.2d at 477-478. 
B. Issue No. 2: Theft and Misappropriation of Property. 
Again, Guenon does not dispute that he downloaded onto his personal disk 
photographs that another employee had uploaded onto a City-owned computer later 
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assigned to Guenon, or that he stored the disk at his residence. Guenon is challenging the 
Appeals Board's finding that "taking, copying and distributing photos to others may be 
an act of theft and misappropriation of property of another..." and "an employee does not 
have the right to copy files from the city's computer and possess them." (See Findings of 
Fact Nos. 10 and 11 attached as Addendum B to Petitioner's Brief). 
The City did not present a shred of evidence to support such findings. It did not 
state the elements of theft and misappropriation. The terms "theft" and 
"misappropriation" are not defined in the City policy manual. Moreover, Guenon's 
conduct does not rise to the level of theft as the term is defined in the Utah Criminal 
Code. Again, there was no evidence to marshal on this issue. 
C. Issue No. 3: Pornography. 
The City asserts that Guenon failed to marshal Sgt. Hodgkinson's testimony that 
"at least three of the pornographic video files...had been opened and viewed again after 
the files were originally downloaded to Petitioner's computer, as recently as July 27, 
2008." (See Brief of Respondent, pg. 7, Fact No. 20) (emphasis added). However, this 
testimony was later recanted on cross-examination: 
Mr. Hancey: Is it your understanding that that is Officer Guenon's 
personal email account? 
Sgt. Hodgkinson: Yes. 
Mr. Hancey: Okay. Is it fair to say then that this is an image that 
was emailed to Officer Guenon on his personal email account? 
Sgt. Hodgkinson: I can't say that for sure, whether it was emailed to 
him or whether he downloaded it from somewhere and emailed to 
somebody else. 
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Mr. Hancey: But, it did, it was transmitted from his email account? 
Sgt. Hodgkinson: Yes. 
Mr. Hancey: Either coming or going? 
Sgt. Hodgkinson: Yes. 
Mr. Hancey: And, you don't know which, which it is? 
Sgt. Hodgkinson: No. I do not. I can tell you it was last accessed 
on the 27th of July. 
R.29:pg. 114(24-25)-pg. 115(1-21). 
Thus, the final state of Sgt. Hodgkinson's testimony was that the images were 
"accessed" on July 27, 2008, not "opened and viewed." Sgt. Hodgkinson admitted that 
"accessed" could mean the content was sent by a third party to Guenon's email account. 
Guenon was not obligated to marshal testimony that was later recanted by the witness and 
that does not support the Appeals Board's findings. 
D. Issue No. 6: Proportionality. 
Guenon has challenged the Appeals Board's finding that termination was 
proportionate to the five offenses he allegedly committed. There is no evidence to 
marshal on this legal question. Furthermore, the City does not identify what facts it 
believes Guenon failed to marshal on this point. 
II. VOLUME OF IDENTIFICATION CARDS DOES NOT WARRANT 
DISPARATE TREATMENT OF PETITIONER. 
In his opening brief, Guenon contends that he should not be disciplined for 
violating a policy when it is common practice among Department officers to do so 
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without being disciplined. In response, the City cites Ogden City Corp. v. Harmon, 116 
P.3d 973 (Utah App. 2005). Harmon is distinguishable from this case. 
In Harmon, a fire captain named Daniel Harmon had violated a department policy 
by allowing male subordinates to engage in sexual horseplay while on the job. In the 
subsequent administrative proceeding, the Ogden Civil Service Commission disregarded 
the incident on the basis that the "horseplay occurred frequently for several years without 
complaint." Id at 977-978. On appeal, this Court disagreed, holding that a policy 
violation is not justifiable merely because it is "common and consensual among the 
participants." Id. 
Thus, Harmon dealt with a commanding officer who had allowed his subordinates 
to violate a department policy over a long period of time. In this case, Guenon is a 
subordinate. He, along with several other officers, had engaged in the practice of storing 
identification cards in their vehicles, leaving them lying around the police station, and 
throwing them away. Guenon and other subordinate officers were thus led to believe that 
their conduct, while technically a violation, was nevertheless acceptable. The evidence at 
the Appeals Board hearing was that while supervisors were aware of the policy 
violations, nobody was ever disciplined except Guenon.1 
While the City contends the police chief did not know about the ongoing, prevalent 
violation of the evidence policy, it is undisputed that at least two police sergeants knew 
the officers under their control were violating the policy but failed to issue any discipline 
or, apparently, report the conduct to their superiors. R. 75: pg. 228 (5-19); R. 93: pg. 301 
(2-25). 
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Furthermore, without any evidentiary support, the Appeals Board found that 
"[Guenon's] violation of the General Order regarding evidence and property was 
substantially more significant than what other officers may have done..." {See Finding 
of Fact No. 8 attached as Addendum B to Petitioner's Brief). Notably, the City's 
evidence policy is not qualified by the length of time involved or the number of 
evidentiary items not booked into evidence. R. 265. Failing to book even one 
identification card into evidence would be a violation of the policy as written, but prior to 
Guenon the City had never disciplined officers for doing just that. R. 23: pg. 89 (8-25); 
R. 183-184. 
III. THE CITY FAILS TO CITE TO ANY EVIDENCE SHOWING 
PETITIONER COMMITTED THEFT OR MISAPPROPRIATION AS 
DEFINED BY THE UTAH CRIMINAL CODE. 
When the City terminated Guenon's employment, it provided him with a 
Disciplinary Order outlining five specific reasons for the termination. R. 222-224. That 
Order states, in relevant part: 
[Guenon] found and otherwise possessed private personal property, 
namely, a DVD/CD. [Guenon] admitted making copies of it and 
distributed these copies to other individuals. This is an act of theft 
and misappropriation of property of another. This act is in violation 
of Police Department General Order 6.01.4 and City Policy 
Standards of Conduct, page 61. 
R. 222. (emphasis added). On the other hand, the Appeals Board did not find Guenon 
had committed theft. It found that "taking, copying and distributing photos to others may 
be an act of theft and misappropriation of property of another..." and that "an employee 
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does not have the right to copy files from the city's computer and possess them." (See 
Findings of Fact Nos. 10 and 11 attached as Addendum B to Petitioner's Brief). 
The role of the Appeals Board is to either uphold or reject the City's findings 
supporting the termination. Indeed, "the [Appeals Board's] role is simply to affirm or 
reverse the police chiefs decision, and it lacks the power to modify or remand." Salt 
Lake City Corp, v. Salt Lake City Civ. Serv. Comm'n, 908 P.2d 871, 875 (Utah App. 
1995); see also Utah Code Ann. 10-3-1106(3)(b)(ii), stating "... the appeal board shall 
forthwith commence its investigation, take and receive evidence, and fully hear and 
determine the matter which relates to the cause for the discharge... . (emphasis added). 
The Appeals Board cannot unilaterally modify the City's stated reasons for termination. 
Thus, the limit of the Appeals Board's authority was to determine whether Guenon had 
committed theft or misappropriation. Because the Appeals Board went beyond that limit 
and entered a different finding, the finding is improper on its face. 
Guenon recognizes that the City was not required to prove Guenon guilty beyond 
a reasonable doubt. However, the City did not even submit substantial evidence to 
support the allegation that Guenon committed theft. Because the City's policy manual 
does not define the terms "theft" and "misappropriation," one is left to assume that the 
statutory definitions in the Utah Criminal Code apply. At the Appeals Board hearing, the 
City neither stated the elements of those offenses nor made any attempt to elicit evidence 
to support them. The undisputed evidence was that Guenon downloaded the photographs 
onto a disk he owned. There was no evidence that the owner of the photographs was ever 
deprived of his or her property, a required element of theft. Utah Code Ann. 76-6-404. 
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The Appeals Board's confusion is apparent given its finding that copying photographs 
"may" be an act of theft. (See Finding of Fact No. 10 attached as Addendum B to 
Petitioner's Opening Brief) 
IV. THE CITY FAILS TO CITE TO ANY EVIDENCE WHATSOEVER 
THAT SHOWS PETITIONER INTENTIONALLY VIEWED 
PORNOGRAPHY. 
The City asserts there is substantial evidence to prove Guenon intentionally 
viewed pornography because Guenon "accessed" the same pornographic images on two 
or three occasions. (Brief of Respondent, pg. 19). The City avoids the issue of whether 
the images were sent unsolicited to Guenon via email or the Instant Messenger program. 
The City's sole witness on this issue, Sgt. Hodgkinson, believed the images were 
transmitted through Guenon's email account. He did not know, however, whether 
Guenon had sent the images or if they had been sent to him. R. 29: pg. 114 (24-25)-pg. 
115(1-21). 
Guenon flatly denied ever downloading or soliciting pornographic images, and 
stated that on the occasions he had received them unsolicited from third-parties he 
immediately deleted them. R. 62: pg. 174 (24-25); pg. 175-176. Parsons Metzkow 
testified that the pornographic images found on Guenon's computer were consistent with 
the instant messenger emoticons other officers had used to disclose their identity. R. 83: 
pg. 258 (1-24). Therefore, the Appeals Board's finding that Guenon violated the City's 
policy against pornography was not supported by substantial evidence. 
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V. THE CITY MAY NOT DISCIPLINE PETITIONER FOR FAILING TO 
FOLLOW THE CHAIN OF COMMAND IN REPORTING VIOLATIONS 
TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND THE ATF. 
The City argues Guenon was not disciplined for reporting violations to the 
Attorney General and ATF but because he failed to follow the chain of command in 
doing so. The City's current position directly contradicts the reasons the City identified 
in its Disciplinary Order to Guenon: 
[Guenon] committed at least two known separate acts of 
insubordination by failing to follow the chain of command by doing 
the following: 
Failure to follow chain of command, namely delivery of a 
DVD/CD to the attorney general's office and making 
complaints against fellow officers. (Department Policy No. 
106.5.) (City Policy Standards of Conduct, page 61.) 
Reporting of alleged ATF violations to ATF in lieu of 
reporting the violations to City personnel. (Department 
Policy No. 106.5.) (City Policy Standards of Conduct, page 
61) 
R. 222-224 (emphasis added). The language is unequivocal: the City terminated Guenon 
for delivering the CD to the Attorney General in furtherance of a criminal complaint and 
for reporting safety violations to the ATF rather than to the City. 
Again, the Appeals Board must either uphold or deny Guenon's termination based 
on the City's original findings; it cannot unilaterally modify the City's stated reasons by 
qualifying that Guenon was terminated only for failing to follow the chain of command. 
Woodward, 908 P.2d at 875. Furthermore, even if Guenon was terminated for failing to 
follow the chain of command, that constitutes a violation of the Utah Protection of Public 
Employees Act. The City cannot take any adverse action in response to employee 
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whistle blowing, whether that action is direct or indirect. A contrary finding would allow 
the City to circumvent the purpose of the Act, which is to promote whistle blowing for 
violations of law and to protect civil servants who do so from retaliation. 
The City also contends Guenon is exempt from protection under the Act because 
he did not report the violations in good faith. The Act provides, in pertinent part, as 
follows: 
An employer may not take adverse action against an employee... 
[who] communicates in good faith the existence of any waste...or 
suspected violation of a law, rule or regulation... 
Utah Code Ann. § 67-21-3(l)(a). The term "good faith" is not explicitly defined in the 
Act but the requirement can reasonably be interpreted in only two ways: (1) the reporter 
must truly believe that the violation he is reporting has occurred; or (2) the reporter must 
have an altruistic motive for reporting a violation. The first interpretation makes much 
more sense in the context of the purpose and intent of the Act; namely, to encourage 
employees to report safety and legal violations and to prevent retaliation against those 
who do. Hall v. Utah State Dept. of Corrections, 24 P.3d 958, 964 (Utah 2001). 
Furthermore, Utah Code Ann. § 67-21-3(l)(b) states in relevant part: 
For purposes of Subsection (a), an employee is presumed to have 
communicated in good faith if he gives written notice or otherwise 
formally communicates the waste, violation, or reasonable suspicion 
to the state auditor. This presumption may be rebutted by showing 
that the employee knew or reasonably ought to have known that the 
report is malicious, false, or frivolous. 
(emphasis added). While not precisely on point (Guenon did not involve the state 
auditor), this provision provides great insight into what the Utah legislature intended by 
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including the term "good faith". Guenon formally communicated his concerns to both 
the Attorney General and the ATF and should be presumed to have acted in good faith. 
Accordingly, Guenon should be protected under the Act unless the City can furnish 
evidence that Guenon "knew or reasonably ought to have known that the report is 
malicious, false, or frivolous." There is no such evidence on the record. 
The State of Idaho has a whistleblower statue that contains nearly identical 
language to Utah' s statute: 
[An employee] communicates in good faith if there is a reasonable 
basis in fact for the communication. Good faith is lacking where the 
employee knew or reasonably ought to have known that the report is 
malicious, false or frivolous. 
Idaho Code § 6-2104(l)(b) (emphasis added). In analyzing this language, the Idaho 
Supreme Court has determined that the personal motivations of the reporter are irrelevant 
so long as the underlying grounds for the report have a good faith basis: 
Some courts have required that 'we must not look only at the 
contents of the report, but also at the reporter's purpose in making 
the report.' Dahlberg, 625 N.W.2d at 254. For instance, the 
whistleblower statutes of some states require that, as an element of 
good faith, the employee not take the actions for personal gain or 
consideration. See e.g. Cipriani, 111 F.Supp.2d at 331; Albright v. 
City of Philadelphia, 399 F.Supp.2d 575, 595-96 (E.D. Pa. 2005). 
However, the Idaho whistleblower act does not contain similar 
language. Therefore, although it may fall into the overall 
consideration of whether she acted in good faith or not, the fact that 
[Appellant] was hoping to gain personally from reporting the waste 
of [co-workers] does not foreclose a finding that her actions were 
protected by the Idaho whistleblower act. 
Curlee v. Kootenai County Fire & Rescue, --- P.3d —, 2008 WL 4595239 (Idaho 2008). 
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Likewise, Utah's whistleblower statute does not contain language requiring an 
employee to report with only the purest of intentions. Therefore, the only consideration 
should be whether Guenon had a good faith belief that violations of the law had occurred, 
and all of the available evidence suggests he did. Guenon's undisputed testimony is that 
he reviewed the photographs and believed the actions depicted in them met the elements 
of the "lewdness involving a child,5' a class A misdemeanor. The fact that the Attorney 
General declined to prosecute has no bearing whatsoever on Guenon's subjective belief. 
Furthermore, it is undisputed that the City had improperly stored explosives. Finally, it 
should be pointed out that the City does not attempt to argue that Guenon lacked a good 
faith belief in the truthfulness of either of his reports. 
VI. PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW BY 
THIS COURT. 
The City argues that termination was an appropriate and proportionate level of 
discipline, noting Guenon's failure to identify another officer who has been disciplined 
for the combination of mishandling identification cards, stealing photographs, viewing 
pornography, and making reports to the Attorney General and ATF. That is not the 
proper standard. As this Court has held: 
2
 Before reporting to the ATF, Guenon reported his concerns about the ATF violation to 
his direct supervisor, Officer Rapella. R. 74: pg. 222 (18-25)-pg. 223 (1-7). Guenon also 
testified that he knew his supervisors were aware of the violation but that nothing was 
being done to rectify the violation. R. 69: pg. 202 (18-25). Capt. Shreeve admitted that 
he knew about the violation but that he had "other pressing matters" to deal with at the 
time. R. 23: pg. 89 (8-25); R. 183-184. This is further evidence that Guenon had a good 
faith belief in what he reported to the ATF. 
12 
It should not be feared that a party who is severely punished, but has 
no history of inconsistency to turn to, is without recourse. While the 
party may have no basis to claim disparity, the party still retains the 
protection of proportionality review. 
Kelly v. Salt Lake City Civil Service Com% 8 P.3d 1048, 1057 (Utah App. 2000). 
Despite the fact that Guenon may not be able to point to another case of discipline 
identical to his own, he is still entitled to a fair and unbiased proportionality review by 
this Court. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Guenon respectfully requests that this Court overturn 
the Appeals Board's findings upholding the City's termination of Guenon. Guenon 
further requests that he be reinstated as a Midvale City police officer with back pay and 
full benefits from the date of his termination until the time of reinstatement. 
DATED this (5*^ day of September, 2009. 
KESLER & RUST 
Ryan EliHiancxy / 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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